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Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk
Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

Larry Zissi v. State Tax Commission of Utah
Case No. 890317

Dear Mr. Butler:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court, I wish to advise the Court that the case of State of Utah
v. Davis, __ Utah Adv. Rep,
(Case #890009-CA, Court of
Appeals, Feb. 12, 1990) may be pertinent to the argument made in
Issue III (pp. 26-32) and Issue VII (pp. 36-37) of Respondent's
Brief. A copy is attached for your convenience.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,

L. A.
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Div,
LAD:gp
Enclosure
cc:

David Bird
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State of Utah,
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Attorneys: Stephen R. McCaughey and Patricia Geary, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra Sjogren, Salt Lake City,
for Respondent

Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Orme.
BILLINGS, Judge:
Defendant David Davis was charged with possession of a
controlled substance without the required tax stamps affixed, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105
(1988). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge, claiming
that section 59-19-105 of the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act* is
unconstitutional. The trial court denied his motion and
consequently defendant entered a conditional plea of no contest.
Defendant argues on appeal that (1) the Utah Drug Stamp Tax
Act violates his privilege against self-incrimination under the
fifth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I,
section 12 of the Utah Constitution; and (2) the Utah Drug Stamp
Tax Act is void for vagueness under the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the
Utah Constitution. We affirm.
1.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-19-101 to -107 (1988)

A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question
of law, and thus, we review the trial court's conclusion, that
the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act is constitutional, for correctness.
£££ Nephi Citv v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 674 (Utah 1989); Provo
City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989); £££ also
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
Furthermore, we recognize that it is the prerogative of the
legislature to create the law. Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80
(Utah 1981). Thus, we afford the legislature's enactments a
presumption of validity. I£.; Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805,
806-07 (Utah 1974); Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 25 Utah 2d 333,
481 P.2d 669, 670 (Utah 1971). We will not strike down a statute
unless it appears to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt. Greaves, 528 P.2d at 807; Pride Club, 481 P.2d at 670.
Nor will we declare a statute unconstitutional if we can find any
reasonable basis to bring it within a constitutional framework.
Greaves, 528 P.2d at 807; State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250
P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1952) .
I.

PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Defendant contends the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act requires him
to incriminate himself in violation of the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution.2 He asserts that proof he
purchased and posted the stamps could be used to provide a link
in the chain of evidence in a subsequent drug prosecution against

2. Although defendant argues that his rights against
self-incrimination under article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution were also violated, he does not contend that our
analysis or the result should be different under the Utah
Constitution from that under the federal constitution.
Furthermore, defendant's analytical approach is restricted to
the fifth amendment. Therefore, we do not address defendant's
state constitutional claim separately. ££. State v. Webb, 779
P.2d 1108, 1111 n.4 (Utah 1989); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d
1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988); State v. Barela, 779 P.2d 1140, 1142
n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

him. Defendant claims that the mere purchase of the stamps is an
admission of criminal behavior because the law only applies to
individuals unlawfully in possession of controlled substances.3
The state argues, on the other hand, that the Utah Drug
Stamp Tax Act does not require stamp purchasers to identify
themselves or even to appear in person to pay the tax and obtain
the stamps.4 Thus, the state claims the tax commission, under
the Utah statutory scheme, receives no incriminating information
to disclose to prosecutors.
The United States Supreme Court has long held that the
government may tax illegal activities. See License Tax Cases, 5
Wall. 462, 471-73, 18 L. Ed. 497, 501 (1867); Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39, 44 (1968). However, the government may not
establish a method of taxation that violates the fifth
amendment. !£. at 44. In order to evaluate defendant's claims,
we first review the scope of protection afforded by the fifth
amendment and then focus on prior decisions discussing the
relationship between taxes levied on illegal activities and the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: "No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. . . ." This right arises
3. In our analysis, we focus on disclosure of the purchaser's
identity at the time of the purchase of the stamps. Defendant
did not purchase stamps and thus the issue of whether evidence
of posting the stamps is incriminating is not before us. See
Sisson v. Triplett, 428 N.W.2d 565, 572 n.7 (Minn. 1988) (the
court refused to resolve the possession issue because the
possession of stamps was not raised by the facts of the case,
thus the defendant's concern was -purely speculative.-). See
discussion of standing in Section III.
4.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105(3) (1988) provided:
Payments required by this chapter shall be
made to the commission on forms provided
by the commission. Dealers are not
required to give their name, address,
Social Security number, or other
identifying information on the form. The
commission shall collect all taxes imposed
under this chapter.

when the government requests information that will subject a
person to criminal liability, Garner v. United States, 424 U.S.
648, 655 (1976), and applies to compelled written as well as
oral testimony. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control
Board, 382 U.S. 70, 78 (1965); State v. Durrant, 244 Kan. 522,
769 P.2d 1174, 1179, cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 3254 (1989).
"The central standard for the privilege's application has been
whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and 'real,'
and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of
incrimination.- Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 53 (quoting Rogers v.
United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951)).
The United States Supreme Court, in defining the scope of
the privilege's protection, stated:
The privilege afforded not only extends to
answers that would in themselves support a
conviction under a federal criminal
statute but likewise embraces those which
furnish a link in the chain of evidence
needed to prosecute the claimant for a
federal crime.
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). However,
a defendant may not successfully assert a fifth amendment
challenge if other protection is granted to him that is broad
enough to provide the same scope of protection as the
privilege. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 58.
The United States Supreme Court has focused on the
privilege against self-incrimination in the context of the
government's ability to tax illegal conduct in four cases:
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v.

United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Haynes vt United States,
390 U.S. 85 (1968); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
In Marchetti, the Court was asked to determine whether a
federal wagering registration and tax law5 was
unconstitutional under the fifth amendment. The registration
provision required taxpayers to register with the Internal
Revenue Service, providing their names and addresses and,
additionally, the names of their employees and agents.
Taxpayers were required to keep daily records showing the
gross amount of the wagers and permit inspection of their
5.

£££ 26 U.S.C. §§ 4401, 4411, 4412, 6107, 6806(c) (1954).

books, Id- at 43. The Court noted that each IRS office was
instructed to "maintain for public inspection a listing of all
who have paid the occupational tax, and to provide certified
copies of the listing upon request to any state or local
prosecuting officer." Id. The law imposed no restrictions on
the use of the information on the return. Id. at 47. In
fact, the IRS provided the information to prosecuting
authorities on a regular basis. Id. at 48.
The Marchetti Court identified three criteria for
determining the constitutionality of a tax statute attacked on
fifth amendment grounds: (1) whether the tax is aimed at
individuals "inherently suspect of criminal activities,M and
whether the taxed activity is in an area "permeated with
criminal statutes," id. at 47 (quoting Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)), (2) whether
an individual is •'required, on pain of criminal prosecution,
to provide information which [the individual] might reasonably
suppose would be available to prosecuting authorities," id. at
48, (3) whether such information "would surely prove a
significant 'link in a chain* of evidence tending to establish
[the individual's] guilt." Id. The Court found the wagering
registration and tax provisions at issue met the test and thus
violated the fifth amendment. Id. at 60.
The government argued in Marchetti, as the state does
here, that the Supreme Court should read restrictions into the
statute prohibiting the use of information developed as a
result of payment of the wagering tax by federal and state
prosecuting authorities. Id. at 58. This limitation would
then provide protection broad enough to have the same effect
as the privilege itself, and render the statutory scheme
constitutional. The United States Supreme Court found the
government's suggestion, in principle, attractive, but felt
precluded from imposing restrictions directly contrary to the
statutory language providing for disclosure to prosecutors.
Id. at 59-60. The Court felt it inappropriate because the
wagering tax system made "quite plain that Congress intended
information obtained as a consequence of registration and
payment of the occupational tax to be provided to interested
prosecuting authorities." Id. at 58-59.
The United States Supreme Court evaluated a different
provision of the same wagering tax scheme—a federal excise
tax on wagering—in Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62
(1968). In addition to the requirements of the wagering tax
litigated in Marchetti, the wagering excise tax also required

taxpayers to submit monthly returns detailing their wagering
activities. Grosso, 390 U.S. at 65. The Court focused in its
decision on whether the defendant was "obliged, on pain of
criminal prosecution, to provide information which would
readily incriminate him, and which he may reasonably expect
would be provided to prosecuting authorities." Jjfl. at 66-67.
Based upon a record which substantiated that prosecuting
authorities had been regularly provided with the information,
the Court found that "[t]hese hazards of incrimination can
only be characterized as 'real and appreciable.•* Xfi. at 67
(quoting Reg, v. Boyes, I B . & S. 311, 330 (1861); Brown v.
Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1896)). This portion of the
wagering statute contained no "statutory instruction, as there
[was] for the occupational tax [in Marchetti!, that state or
local prosecuting officers be provided listings of those who
have paid the excise tax." Ifi. at 66. However, the Court
noted, in upholding a fifth amendment challenge, that "neither
has Congress imposed explicit restrictions upon the use of
information obtained as a consequence of payment of the tax."
Id. The Court also emphasized that the record indicated that
the IRS had regularly provided prosecuting authorities with
this incriminating information. Id.
Again, as in Marchetti, the government urged the Grosso
Court to interpret the act to prevent prosecuting authorities
frc using the information disclose:? under the statutory
scheme and, thus, uphold its constitutionality. 13. at 69.
The Grosso Court found this approach inappropriate because it
would lead to the incongruous result that restrictions on
disclosure and use of information by prosecuting authorities
would apply to one portion of the wagering tax statutory
scheme and not another. The Court emphasized that the
challenged act was "'an integral part' of the same [taxing]
system" that the Marchetti Court had refused to restrict.
Id.
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 60).
In Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968), the
defendant challenged registration and taxing provisions
applicable to certain classes of firearms. The firearm
registration requirement was "directed principally at those
persons who [had] obtained possession of a firearm without
complying with the Act's other requirements, and who
therefore [were] immediately threatened by criminal
prosecutions . . . • They [were] unmistakably persons
•inherently suspect of criminal activities.'" 13. at 96
(quoting Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382
U.S. 70, 79 (1965)).

Furthermore, the act required a registrant to give his
name, address, date of birth, Social Security number, place of
business or employment, whether he had been convicted of a
felony, and a full description of the firearm and the place
where the firearm was kept- Id- The Court found the act met
the Marchetti test, id. at 98-99, and reversed defendant's
conviction. Id. at 100. Again, the Court refused to avoid
the constitutional problem by restricting federal and state
authorities from using the information because the statutory
scheme explicitly provided for disclosure of the information
collected to prosecuting authorities. Id. at 99-100.
Finally, in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), the
United States Supreme Court dealt with a constitutional
challenge to a portion of the federal Narcotic Drugs Import
and Export Act 6 and the federal Marihuana Tax Act.' This
legislation was similar to the wagering tax system in that it
required those paying the tax to register on tax forms,
listing their names and addresses. Id. at 14. The Court
found that compliance with the act would create a "real and
appreciable" hazard of incrimination. Id. at 18. The Court,
after reviewing the statutory language and legislative
history, concluded, as it had in Marchetti and Grosso, that
"the furnishing of information to interested prosecutors was a
'significant element of Congress' purposes in adopting' the
statutes" and, thus, refused a construction restricting
disclosure. Id. at 26.
We examine the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act under Marchetti to
determine (1) whether the tax is aimed at individuals
"inherently suspect of criminal activities," (2) whether an
individual is "required on pain of criminal prosecution to
provide information" which he might reasonably think would be
made available to prosecuting authorities, and (3) whether the
information would provide "a significant link in a chain of
evidence tending to establish the individual's guilt."

6.

£££ 21 U.S.C. § 176a(2)(h) (1956) (repealed 1970).

7.

£££ 26 U.S.C. §§ 4741-4744 (1954) (repealed 1970).

Section 59-19-105 provided:
(1) When a dealer purchases, acquires,
transports, or imports into this state
marihuana or controlled substances, he
shall permanently affix the official
indicia on the marihuana or controlled
substances evidencing the payment of the
tax required under this chapter. No stamp
or other official indicia may be used more
than once.
(2) Taxes imposed upon marihuana or
controlled substances by this chapter are
due and payable immediately upon
acquisition or possession in this state by
a dealer.
(3) Payments required by this chapter
shall be made to the commission on forms
provided by the commission. Dealers are
not required to give their name, address,
Social Security number, or other
identifying information on the form. The
commission shall collect all taxes imposed
under this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105 (1988). 8
The first step of the Marchetti test is clearly met as the
statute applies only to those dealing in illegal controlled
substances.
The second step involves a closer question. The Utah Drug
Stamp Tax Act, unlike the taxing provisions found defective in
Marchetti, Grosso, Haynes, and Leary, does not require persons
purchasing the stamps to disclose their identity. Further,
there is nothing in the record to indicate that the identity of
purchasers has been provided to prosecuting authorities
historically. See, e.g., Grosso, 390 U.S. at 66. Thus, there
is substantially less danger that information gathered as a
result of defendant's compliance with the statute would reach
prosecuting authorities. We need not decide whether there is
nevertheless still a "substantial and real" risk that
defendant's identity would be observed if he purchased the
stamps and whether there is a real risk this indirect identity
information would be communicated to law enforcement
personnel. This is so because, even assuming the second and
third steps of the Marchetti test were met, we can still save
Section 59-19-105 was amended in 1989.

See note 10, infra

the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act—as is our duty under Greaves v.
State, 528 P.2d 805, 807 (Utah 1974)—if we interpret the
statutory scheme to prevent the use of any identity information
obtained by prosecuting authorities as a result of a person's
compliance with the act. This protection "• is so broad as to
have the same extent in scope and effect' as the privilege
[against self-incrimination] itself." Marchetti. 390 U.S. at
58 (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585
(1892)). Unlike the federal statutes in Marchetti, Grosso, and
Haynes where a limiting construction was rejected, the Utah
Drug Stamp Tax Act has no provision providing for disclosure of
any identifying information to prosecuting authorities.9
Finally, defendant points to no statutory language or
legislative history to indicate that the Utah Legislature
intended the information be disclosed and used by prosecuting
authorities. Compare Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 58-59; Grosso, 390
U.S. at 68; Leary, 395 U.S. at 16.
We simply cannot say that one of the Utah Legislature's
objectives in enacting the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act was to
"facilitate criminal prosecutions based upon information
obtained from compliance with the statutes." State v. Durrant,
244 Kan. 522, 769 P.2d 1174, 1182, cert, denied, 109 S. Ct.
3254 (1989).
In fact, the Utah Legislature has subsequently clarified
its intention on the issue of the use of identity information
gained under the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act by its 1989 amendment
to the Act which explicitly prohibits disclosure and provides
confidentiality.10 See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 486
9. Although there was no explicit provision for disclosure of
the tax form information under the wagering excise tax in
Grosso, the United States Supreme Court held it could not
restrict the disclosure because the wagering excise tax was part
of the same statutory scheme as the wagering occupational tax,
which contained a disclosure provision. See Grosso, 390 U.S. at
69.
10. Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105 (1989) provides, in pertinent
part:
(3) Payments required by this chapter
shall be made to the commission on forms
provided by the commission.
(4) (a) A dealer is not required to give
his name, address, Social Security
number, or other identifying
information on the form.

(Utah 1988) ("When a statute is amended, the amendment is
persuasive evidence of the legislature's intent when it passed
the former, unamended statute."); ££_£ also State v. Barnett,
142 Ariz. 592, 691 P.2d 683, 687 (1984) (subsequent
legislation, while not controlling, "is a strong indication of
the legislature's original intent"); Board of County Comm'rs v.
CMC of Nev., Inc., 99 Nev. 739, 670 P.2d 102, 106 (1983)
("amendment is persuasive evidence of the purpose and intent of
the legislature"); Stratman v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 760 P.2d
974, 986-87 (Wyo. 1988) (subsequent legislation may be used as
aid to interpret ambiguous statute).
Based upon the foregoing, we find the pre-amendment Utah
Drug Stamp Tax Act can be "found to come within a
constitutional framework," Greaves, 528 P.2d at 807, by
construing it to prohibit the use of any information gained as
a result of a purchaser's compliance with the act to establish
a link in the chain of evidence in a subsequent drug
prosecution. As a result of this stricture, we find that the
(footnote 10 continued)
(b) The commission or its employees
may not reveal any facts contained in
any report, form, or return required
by this chapter or any information
obtained from a dealer.
(c) None of the information contained
in a report, form, or return or
otherwise obtained from a dealer in
connection with this s~ ::.. rr.ay be
used against the deale_ .:* any
criminal proceeding unless it is
independently obtained, except in
connection with a proceeding
involving taxes due under this
chapter from the dealer making the
return. This subsection supersedes
any provision to the contrary.
(d) A person who discloses
information in violation of this
subsection is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105 (1989).

scope of the immunity provided by the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act
is broad enough to give the same protections provided by the
fifth amendment and thus uphold its constitutionality.H
II.

VOID FOR VAGUENESS

Defendant also claims the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act is
unconstitutionally vague under the due process clauses of the
federal and Utah constitutions. He argues that even though the
law states the stamps must be affixed to the controlled
substances, it does not state where on the package the stamps
are to be placed. He asserts that the absence of this
directory instruction results in his being unable to conform
his conduct to the statute and that it may also result in
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. He points out that
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-104(1) (1988) instructed the tax
commission to adopt a uniform system for affixing the indicia,
yet the tax commission has failed to do so.
11. We note that three states have ruled on the
constitutionality of drug stamp tax statutes. However, all of
the statutes considered are similar to Utah's amended statute
containing provisions on confidentiality and/or a prohibition
against the use of the information for prosecution purposes.

£££ State v, Purrant/ 244 Kan. 522, 769 P.2d 1174, certt denied,
109 S. Ct. 3254 (1989) (Kansas Supreme Court noted taxpayers did
not have to disclose their identity. 1&. at 1180. But the
court emphasized that even if the identity of the dealer could
be ascertained some other way, the statute required that the
information remain confidential, isJ., and thus concluded that
the protections included in the statute fell within fifth
amendment boundaries. Jji. at 1183.); Sisson v. Triplett, 428
N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 1988) (Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished
the United States Supreme Court cases previously discussed,
noted that the dealers did not have to submit the form and pay
the tax in person or reveal their identities, and found that the
confidentiality provisions in the statute adequately protected
the defendant from self-incrimination. !£. at 574.); State v.
Roberts, 384 N.W.2d 688 (S.D. 1986) (South Dakota Supreme Court
found the confidentiality provisions in the statute inadequate.
The significant difference in Roberts is that while the statute
purports to protect the dealer with the language, w[s]uch
prosecution may not, however, be initiated or facilitated by the
disclosure of confidential information,- another provision of
the same act allows for the disclosure of the information to
state and local agencies upon written request. I£. at 690.).

We find that defendant does not have standing to challenge
the vagueness of this portion of the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act.
Utah courts have long held that -before a party may attack the
constitutionality of a statute he must be adversely affected by
that very statute. . . . •[T]he court will not listen to an
objection made as to the constitutionality of an act by parties
whose rights are not specifically affected.'" Pride Club, Inc.
v. State, 25 Utah 2d 333, 481 P.2d 669, 671 (1971) (quoting
State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414, 420 (1939)).
Further, "a person affected by one portion of the statute may
not plead the invalidity of another portion of the same statute
not applicable to his case.w Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349,
352 (Utah 1979).
Defendant did not pay the tax and receive the stamps. He
could not have been confused about where to place those
stamps. He was not charged with placing the stamps in the
wrong area of the controlled substance. He was charged with
the failure to pay the tax and obtain the stamps and, thus, was
not injured by the provision concerning where to place the
stamps. 12

12. Even if defendant had standing to assert the vagueness of
the statute, we would find his claim without merit. In order to
pass due process muster, statutes must "define a criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does
not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); see also State v.
Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1050 (Utah 1984); Greaves v, State, 528
P.2d 805, 807 (Utah 1974); State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250
P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1952) .
The law at issue imposes criminal sanctions for failing to
affix the official indicia to illegal drugs. The criminal
sanction imposed is not for misplacing the stamps, but for
failing to affix them at all. The failure to affix the stamps
to controlled substances is clearly a violation of the law and
puts all those who deal in controlled substances on notice that
their failure to place the stamps on the controlled substance
will result in prosecution. Further, the law is sufficiently
definite to instruct law enforcement agents where to look for
the stamps—on the drugs and, thus, they may not arbitrarily or
discriminatorily enforce the statute as there is no violation if
the stamps are placed anywhere on the drugs.

In conclusion, we find the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act does not
violate the fifth amendment and that defendant does not have
standing to challenge the act as vague under the due process
clause of the United States and Utah Constitutions. Thus, we
affirm defendant's conviction.

Judith M. Billings, Judge

CJdu^JU*^
Richard C. Davidson, Judge

Gregqcf K. Orme, Judge

